"""造 RBAC 测试数据，验证真实链路身份加载与越权拦截。

数据使用 9001 起的号段（角色 9001-9003、权限 9001-9046），便于清理，不影响业务数据。
权限码是几条线叠加出来的：9001-9019 基础能力、9020-9034 投顾线、9041-9046 投顾治理类与客服二期。

⚠️ 本脚本对**权限、角色、角色绑定**是 **DELETE 重建**：`DELETE FROM sys_permission WHERE
id BETWEEN 9001 AND 9099` 会删掉该号段内**所有**权限（包括别的线用 `grant_*.py` 建的），
再按 `PERMISSIONS` 重建，并且**只清 role_id 9001-9003 的角色绑定**。三个已知后果：

1. 新增权限码必须并进本文件的 `PERMISSIONS`，否则重建一次就没了（表现为"接口突然 403"）；
2. `advisor`（9004）这类不在 `ROLES` 里的角色，其绑定**不会被清** —— 若它们引用的
   permission_id 在重建时换了语义，绑定就会指向错误的权限码。改 id→code 映射前先确认；
3. **`sys_user` 不再是 DELETE 重建**（2026-09-12 改）：投顾域的 `advisor_profile_tag` 等表用
   FK 引用 `sys_user`，一旦库里有数据引用 9001-9003，`DELETE FROM sys_user` 会被外键拒绝
   （MySQL 1451），**种子整个跑不完**；而 `commit()` 在最后，所以外部表现是"什么都没发生"。
   现已改为「存在则 UPDATE 非密码字段、不存在才 INSERT」，且**不覆盖 `password_hash`**，
   因此重跑种子不会再弄丢演示密码，也不需要事后补 `set_user_password.py`。

为什么需要这份种子：权限码必须与**代码实际声明**一致——工具声明写在
`app/service/agent/bootstrap.py`（`check_suitability` 需 `suitability:read`、
`query_fund_quote` 需 `fund:quote:read`），接口校验写在各 Service 的
`AuthorizationService.require(...)`。种子缺权限的后果不是"少测一项"，而是
"功能明明实现了却一直 403"，让验收与集成测试得出错误结论。
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import sys
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from pathlib import Path

from sqlalchemy import text

PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
if str(PROJECT_ROOT) not in sys.path:
    sys.path.insert(0, str(PROJECT_ROOT))

from app.core.contracts import RequestContext  # noqa: E402
from app.infrastructure.db import SessionFactory  # noqa: E402
from app.service.identity_service import IdentityService  # noqa: E402

CUSTOMER_USER = "9001"
RISK_USER = "9002"
ADMIN_USER = "9003"

# (权限 id, 权限码, resource, action, data_scope)
PERMISSIONS: tuple[tuple[int, str, str, str, str], ...] = (
    (9001, "agent:run", "agent", "run", "self"),
    (9002, "suitability:read", "suitability", "read", "self"),
    (9003, "fund:quote:read", "fund", "quote", "self"),
    (9004, "conversation:create", "conversation", "create", "self"),
    (9005, "conversation:close", "conversation", "close", "self"),
    (9006, "conversation:feedback", "conversation", "feedback", "self"),
    (9007, "agent:cancel", "agent", "cancel", "self"),
    (9008, "handover:create", "handover", "create", "self"),
    (9009, "memory:read:self", "memory", "read", "self"),
    (9010, "memory:read:customer", "memory", "read", "own_customers"),
    (9011, "knowledge:reference:read", "knowledge", "reference", "self"),
    (9012, "audit:read", "audit", "read", "all"),
    (9013, "config:read", "config", "read", "all"),
    (9014, "config:write", "config", "write", "all"),
    (9015, "config:review", "config", "review", "all"),
    (9016, "config:activate", "config", "activate", "all"),
    (9017, "model-endpoint:manage", "model-endpoint", "manage", "all"),
    # `query_knowledge` 工具声明该权限（`app/service/knowledge_tool.py` 的
    # `REQUIRED_PERMISSION`）；缺失会让客服 Agent 调工具时被拒（缺少工具权限）。
    # 补入种子以保证"重跑种子 / 换环境"后权限仍存在。
    (9018, "knowledge:query", "knowledge", "query", "self"),
    # 知识库**管理**面（Task 11）：上传/列表/删除三个端点统一要这个权限码
    # （`app/service/knowledge_management_service.py` 的 `REQUIRED_PERMISSION`）。
    # 刻意不把 `knowledge:query`（客户角色也有）复用成管理权限：那会让客户看到整库文档清单。
    # 归属：只给 admin（ADMIN_PERMISSIONS 是全量元组，自动包含本行）。
    (9019, "knowledge:manage", "knowledge", "manage", "all"),
    (9020, "investment-goal:write:self", "investment-goal", "write", "self"),
    (9021, "investment-goal:confirm:self", "investment-goal", "confirm", "self"),
    (9022, "investment-goal:read:self", "investment-goal", "read", "self"),
    (9023, "product-recommendation:generate:self", "product-recommendation", "generate", "self"),
    (9024, "product-recommendation:read:self", "product-recommendation", "read", "self"),
    (9025, "portfolio-analysis:read:self", "portfolio-analysis", "read", "self"),
    (9026, "asset-allocation:generate:self", "asset-allocation", "generate", "self"),
    (9027, "profile-governance:read", "profile-governance", "read", "all"),
    (9028, "profile-governance:review", "profile-governance", "review", "all"),
    (9029, "investment-goal:review", "investment-goal", "review", "all"),
    (9030, "investment-goal:publish", "investment-goal", "publish", "all"),
    (9031, "product-recommendation:review", "product-recommendation", "review", "all"),
    (9032, "product-recommendation:publish", "product-recommendation", "publish", "all"),
    (9033, "asset-allocation:backtest", "asset-allocation", "backtest", "all"),
    (9034, "product-comparison:read:self", "product-comparison", "read", "self"),
    # ---- 9041-9046：投顾治理类 3 个 + 客服二期 3 个 ----
    # 投顾线（`bbf623a`）已把 9020-9034 放进本种子，但漏了这 3 个治理类权限码，
    # 而 `app/service/` 的治理接口直接要求它们 —— 缺了就是"实现了却一直 403"。
    # 号段从 9041 起：库里曾有一批 9020-9035 是 `grant_advisor_role.py` 用旧号段建的，
    # 与种子的 9020-9034 **id→code 映射不同**，挪到 9041 之后与两侧都不冲突。
    (9041, "product-governance:read", "product-governance", "read", "all"),
    (9042, "product-governance:review", "product-governance", "review", "all"),
    (9043, "product-governance:sync", "product-governance", "sync", "all"),
    # 客服二期（画像候选 + 转人工工单）的 3 个权限码。此前不在任何种子或迁移里，
    # 属"环境数据"：代码合过来后若库里缺这几行，候选确认/审核与工单查看 5 个接口一律 403。
    (9044, "memory:candidate:confirm", "memory:candidate", "confirm", "self"),
    (9045, "memory:candidate:review", "memory:candidate", "review", "all"),
    (9046, "handover:read", "handover", "read", "all"),
    # ---- 9047-9050：风控模块四个权限码 ----
    # 风控 Service 和 Agent 工具都按这四个权限码失败关闭。此前依赖
    # `grant_risk_permissions.py` 临时补种，重跑本脚本时会删除 9001-9099 号段内的
    # 风控权限，导致登录成功后风控接口全部 403。这里纳入唯一权限定义源。
    (9047, "risk:alert:read", "risk", "alert", "all"),
    (9048, "risk:alert:write", "risk", "alert", "all"),
    (9049, "risk:alert:scan", "risk", "alert", "all"),
    (9050, "risk:report:mail", "risk", "report", "all"),
    # ---- 9051-9056：代码早就要求、但**从未建过**的 6 个权限码 ----
    # 症状同样是 `AGENT_PERMISSION_DENIED: 缺少操作权限`：看着像角色配错，其实是
    # **权限码根本不存在**，于是任何角色都过不去。对账工具见
    # `tools/check_permission_coverage.py`（把"代码声明的权限"与"库里各角色拥有的"比一遍）。
    # 推广材料：`promotion_material_service.py` 用这四个；第 164 行专门判
    # `"advisor" in context.roles`，说明投顾本来就在这条业务线上。
    (9051, "promotion:read", "promotion", "read", "all"),
    (9052, "promotion:write", "promotion", "write", "all"),
    (9053, "promotion:review", "promotion", "review", "all"),
    (9054, "promotion:deliver", "promotion", "deliver", "all"),
    # NL2SQL 工具声明该权限（`bootstrap.py`）；`financial_nl2sql_service.py:272` 的角色
    # 白名单是 {advisor, operator, admin, super_admin} —— 投顾与运营都要用它。
    (9055, "financial:nl2sql:read", "financial", "nl2sql", "all"),
    # 平台验证探针工具（`platform_probe.py`），只给 admin。
    (9056, "probe:read", "probe", "read", "all"),
)

# 客户：业务侧自助能力（自己的会话、反馈、转人工、自己的记忆画像）。
CUSTOMER_PERMISSIONS = (
    9001, 9002, 9003, 9004, 9005, 9006, 9007, 9008, 9009, 9011, 9018,
    9020, 9021, 9022, 9023, 9024, 9025, 9026, 9034,
    # 客服二期：客户确认/拒绝**自己**的画像候选（服务层按 customer_id 过滤，不越权）。
    9044,
)
# 风控专员：业务侧只读 + 跨客户记忆 + 审计只读，不含配置写权限。
RISK_PERMISSIONS = (
    9001, 9002, 9003, 9010, 9011, 9012,
    9047, 9048, 9049, 9050,
)
# 平台管理员：管理面全套（配置发布四态 + 模型端点 + 审计）。
ADMIN_PERMISSIONS = tuple(row[0] for row in PERMISSIONS)

ROLES: tuple[tuple[int, str, str], ...] = (
    (9001, "customer", "客户"),
    (9002, "risk_operator", "风控专员"),
    (9003, "admin", "平台管理员"),
)

USERS: tuple[tuple[int, str, str, str], ...] = (
    (9001, "T-CUST", "cust_t", "customer"),
    (9002, "T-RISK", "risk_t", "employee"),
    (9003, "T-ADMIN", "admin_t", "employee"),
    # 9004 review_t：**不绑任何角色、不设密码**的账号，用于两个边界用例：
    #   - `test_rbac_read_mysql`：账号**存在但无权限** → 应返回 200 + 空权限集，而不是 404（错误码语义）；
    #   - `test_auth_login_mysql` 的 `PLACEHOLDER_ACCOUNTS`：`password_hash` 是占位符 → 必须 401 而非 500。
    # 2026-09-12 补：此前这两个测试都引用它，但**种子从未创建**它 —— 后者因"账号不存在也返回 401"
    # 而恰好蒙过，前者则一直红（`/admin/users/9004/roles` 返回 404 "用户不存在"）。
    (9004, "T-REVIEW", "review_t", "employee"),
)

#: 用户 → 角色绑定，**显式列出**而不是按位置配对。
#:
#: 原先写的是 `zip(user_ids, role_ids, strict=True)`，隐含假设「USERS 与 ROLES 一一对应」；
#: 9004 review_t 是**故意不绑角色**的账号，一加进来 zip 就会
#: `ValueError: zip() argument 2 is shorter than argument 1`，整个种子跑不完
#: （而 commit 在最后，外部表现是"什么都没发生"）。显式列表让"谁绑什么"一眼可见，
#: 也不受两侧顺序/长度变化影响。
USER_ROLES: tuple[tuple[int, int], ...] = (
    (9001, 9001),  # cust_t  → customer
    (9002, 9002),  # risk_t  → risk_operator
    (9003, 9003),  # admin_t → admin
    # 9004 review_t 不在此列：「账号存在但无权限」正是它要覆盖的场景。
)

GRANTS: tuple[tuple[int, tuple[int, ...]], ...] = (
    (9001, CUSTOMER_PERMISSIONS),
    (9002, RISK_PERMISSIONS),
    (9003, ADMIN_PERMISSIONS),
)


async def seed() -> None:
    now = datetime.now(UTC).replace(tzinfo=None)
    # MySQL 的 DATETIME(0) 会把微秒四舍五入到秒：若用"当前时间"写 assigned_at，
    # 进位后可能落在未来，使紧随其后的 `assigned_at <= now` 授权校验判定
    # "尚未生效"，于是刚种好的账号一个权限都拿不到（表现为 roles=() 而非报错）。
    # 往前留 5 秒，彻底避开这个舍入窗口。
    effective_at = now - timedelta(seconds=5)
    async with SessionFactory() as session:
        await session.execute(
            text("DELETE FROM sys_role_permission WHERE role_id IN (9001,9002,9003)")
        )
        await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_user_role WHERE user_id IN (9001,9002,9003)"))
        # 风控权限在旧环境中可能由 `grant_risk_permissions.py` 自动分配了任意主键。
        # 先按 permission_code 清掉角色绑定和旧主键，保证本次能用固定号段重建；
        # 否则 `risk:report:mail` 已存在于 9001-9099 之外时会触发 permission_code 唯一键冲突。
        await session.execute(text("""
            DELETE rp FROM sys_role_permission rp
            JOIN sys_permission p ON p.id = rp.permission_id
            WHERE p.permission_code IN (
                'risk:alert:read', 'risk:alert:write',
                'risk:alert:scan', 'risk:report:mail'
            )
        """))
        await session.execute(text("""
            DELETE FROM sys_permission
            WHERE permission_code IN (
                'risk:alert:read', 'risk:alert:write',
                'risk:alert:scan', 'risk:report:mail'
            )
        """))
        await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_permission WHERE id BETWEEN 9001 AND 9099"))
        await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_role WHERE id IN (9001,9002,9003)"))
        # 不再 DELETE sys_user：投顾域的 advisor_profile_tag 等表用 FK 引用它，库里有数据引用
        # 9001-9003 时删除会被外键拒绝（1451）导致整个种子跑不完，而且删了用户等于把演示密码
        # 一起弄丢。改为下面循环里的「更新或插入」，且不覆盖 password_hash。

        for user_id, user_no, user_name, user_type in USERS:
            updated = await session.execute(
                text(
                    "UPDATE sys_user SET user_no=:no, username=:name, user_type=:type,"
                    " professional_investor_status='none', fund_account_status='closed',"
                    " status='正常', updated_at=:now WHERE id=:id"
                ),
                {"id": user_id, "no": user_no, "name": user_name, "type": user_type, "now": now},
            )
            if updated.rowcount == 0:
                await session.execute(
                    text(
                        "INSERT INTO sys_user (id, user_no, username, password_hash, user_type,"
                        " professional_investor_status, fund_account_status, status,"
                        " created_at, updated_at)"
                        " VALUES (:id,:no,:name,'x',:type,'none','closed','正常',:now,:now)"
                    ),
                    {"id": user_id, "no": user_no, "name": user_name,
                     "type": user_type, "now": now},
                )
        for role_id, role_code, role_name in ROLES:
            await session.execute(
                text(
                    "INSERT INTO sys_role (id, role_code, role_name, status, created_at, updated_at)"
                    " VALUES (:id,:code,:name,'active',:now,:now)"
                ),
                {"id": role_id, "code": role_code, "name": role_name, "now": now},
            )
        for permission_id, code, resource, action, scope in PERMISSIONS:
            await session.execute(
                text(
                    "INSERT INTO sys_permission"
                    " (id, permission_code, resource, action, data_scope, created_at, updated_at)"
                    " VALUES (:id,:code,:resource,:action,:scope,:now,:now)"
                ),
                {"id": permission_id, "code": code, "resource": resource, "action": action,
                 "scope": scope, "now": now},
            )
        for user_id, role_id in USER_ROLES:
            await session.execute(
                text(
                    "INSERT INTO sys_user_role (user_id, role_id, assigned_at)"
                    " VALUES (:user,:role,:now)"
                ),
                {"user": user_id, "role": role_id, "now": effective_at},
            )
        for role_id, permission_ids in GRANTS:
            for permission_id in permission_ids:
                await session.execute(
                    text(
                        "INSERT INTO sys_role_permission (role_id, permission_id, created_at)"
                        " VALUES (:role,:perm,:now)"
                    ),
                    {"role": role_id, "perm": permission_id, "now": now},
                )
        await session.commit()


async def verify() -> None:
    service = IdentityService()
    for label, user_id in (("customer", CUSTOMER_USER), ("risk_operator", RISK_USER),
                           ("admin", ADMIN_USER)):
        context = await service.resolve(RequestContext(user_id=user_id, trace_id="verify-trace"))
        print(
            f"{label:14s} roles={context.roles} permissions={sorted(context.permissions)} "
            f"portal={context.portal} data_scope={context.data_scope}"
        )
    customer = await service.resolve(
        RequestContext(user_id=CUSTOMER_USER, trace_id="verify-trace")
    )
    missing = {"agent:run", "suitability:read", "fund:quote:read"} - set(customer.permissions)
    if missing:
        raise SystemExit(f"客户角色缺少公共工具所需权限：{sorted(missing)}")
    print("verified: customer can pass public tool authorization checks")


async def main() -> None:
    await seed()
    await verify()


if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(main())