Windows
2fe7d0c506
客户在自己主页提交申报 → 投顾工作台受理 → 自动跑既有推荐逻辑生成一份待审核草稿 → 投顾再走既有的「审核通过 → 发送给客户」。补上原先「客户只能被动等方案」的缺口。 后端 - 新增表 advisor_service_request（本轮新建，带 AUTO_INCREMENT）+ 迁移 20260916_advisor_service_request（幂等：先查表再建，兼容本库 alembic 指针滞后） - 新增 AdvisorServiceRequestService：create / list_mine / queue / review · 申报前置：风险测评必须存在且未失效（FM-03，12 个月），服务端判 · 队列复用 ProductRecommendationService._visible_customer_ids（本人 + 归属），待受理排前 · 受理即调用推荐逻辑生成草稿并把 content_id 回填；生成前置失败给出人话原因并保持待受理 · 「已发送客户」不落库，由关联方案 published_at 推导，避免两处状态各写各的 - 权限码 9071-9074（客户 write/read:self、投顾 read/review），已进种子与授权工具 前端 - 投顾工作台新增「客户申报」面板（受理 / 驳回，驳回理由客户可见） - 客户页新增申报表单（金额/期限/风险偏好/备注）与「我的申报」列表 客户自助路由刻意不挂投顾灰度闸门：那是投顾业务的灰度，客户提交自己的申请不该被它拦下。
394 lines
24 KiB
Python
394 lines
24 KiB
Python
"""造 RBAC 测试数据，验证真实链路身份加载与越权拦截。
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数据使用 9001 起的号段（角色 9001-9003、权限 9001-9046），便于清理，不影响业务数据。
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权限码是几条线叠加出来的：9001-9019 基础能力、9020-9034 投顾线、9041-9046 投顾治理类与客服二期。
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⚠️ 本脚本对**权限、角色、角色绑定**是 **DELETE 重建**：`DELETE FROM sys_permission WHERE
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id BETWEEN 9001 AND 9099` 会删掉该号段内**所有**权限（包括别的线用 `grant_*.py` 建的），
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再按 `PERMISSIONS` 重建，并且**只清 role_id 9001-9003 的角色绑定**。三个已知后果：
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1. 新增权限码必须并进本文件的 `PERMISSIONS`，否则重建一次就没了（表现为"接口突然 403"）；
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2. `advisor`（9004）这类不在 `ROLES` 里的角色，其绑定**不会被清** —— 若它们引用的
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permission_id 在重建时换了语义，绑定就会指向错误的权限码。改 id→code 映射前先确认；
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3. **`sys_user` 不再是 DELETE 重建**（2026-09-12 改）：投顾域的 `advisor_profile_tag` 等表用
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FK 引用 `sys_user`，一旦库里有数据引用 9001-9003，`DELETE FROM sys_user` 会被外键拒绝
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（MySQL 1451），**种子整个跑不完**；而 `commit()` 在最后，所以外部表现是"什么都没发生"。
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现已改为「存在则 UPDATE 非密码字段、不存在才 INSERT」，且**不覆盖 `password_hash`**，
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因此重跑种子不会再弄丢演示密码，也不需要事后补 `set_user_password.py`。
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为什么需要这份种子：权限码必须与**代码实际声明**一致——工具声明写在
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`app/service/agent/bootstrap.py`（`check_suitability` 需 `suitability:read`、
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`query_fund_quote` 需 `fund:quote:read`），接口校验写在各 Service 的
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`AuthorizationService.require(...)`。种子缺权限的后果不是"少测一项"，而是
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"功能明明实现了却一直 403"，让验收与集成测试得出错误结论。
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import sys
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from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
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from pathlib import Path
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from sqlalchemy import text
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PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
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if str(PROJECT_ROOT) not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, str(PROJECT_ROOT))
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from app.core.contracts import RequestContext # noqa: E402
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from app.infrastructure.db import SessionFactory # noqa: E402
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from app.service.identity_service import IdentityService # noqa: E402
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CUSTOMER_USER = "9001"
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RISK_USER = "9002"
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ADMIN_USER = "9003"
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# (权限 id, 权限码, resource, action, data_scope)
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PERMISSIONS: tuple[tuple[int, str, str, str, str], ...] = (
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(9001, "agent:run", "agent", "run", "self"),
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(9002, "suitability:read", "suitability", "read", "self"),
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(9003, "fund:quote:read", "fund", "quote", "self"),
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(9004, "conversation:create", "conversation", "create", "self"),
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(9005, "conversation:close", "conversation", "close", "self"),
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(9006, "conversation:feedback", "conversation", "feedback", "self"),
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(9007, "agent:cancel", "agent", "cancel", "self"),
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(9008, "handover:create", "handover", "create", "self"),
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(9009, "memory:read:self", "memory", "read", "self"),
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(9010, "memory:read:customer", "memory", "read", "own_customers"),
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(9011, "knowledge:reference:read", "knowledge", "reference", "self"),
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(9012, "audit:read", "audit", "read", "all"),
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(9013, "config:read", "config", "read", "all"),
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(9014, "config:write", "config", "write", "all"),
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(9015, "config:review", "config", "review", "all"),
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(9016, "config:activate", "config", "activate", "all"),
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(9017, "model-endpoint:manage", "model-endpoint", "manage", "all"),
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# `query_knowledge` 工具声明该权限（`app/service/knowledge_tool.py` 的
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# `REQUIRED_PERMISSION`）；缺失会让客服 Agent 调工具时被拒（缺少工具权限）。
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# 补入种子以保证"重跑种子 / 换环境"后权限仍存在。
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(9018, "knowledge:query", "knowledge", "query", "self"),
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# 知识库**管理**面（Task 11）：上传/列表/删除三个端点统一要这个权限码
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# （`app/service/knowledge_management_service.py` 的 `REQUIRED_PERMISSION`）。
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# 刻意不把 `knowledge:query`（客户角色也有）复用成管理权限：那会让客户看到整库文档清单。
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# 归属：只给 admin（ADMIN_PERMISSIONS 是全量元组，自动包含本行）。
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(9019, "knowledge:manage", "knowledge", "manage", "all"),
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(9020, "investment-goal:write:self", "investment-goal", "write", "self"),
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(9021, "investment-goal:confirm:self", "investment-goal", "confirm", "self"),
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(9022, "investment-goal:read:self", "investment-goal", "read", "self"),
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(9023, "product-recommendation:generate:self", "product-recommendation", "generate", "self"),
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(9024, "product-recommendation:read:self", "product-recommendation", "read", "self"),
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(9025, "portfolio-analysis:read:self", "portfolio-analysis", "read", "self"),
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(9026, "asset-allocation:generate:self", "asset-allocation", "generate", "self"),
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(9027, "profile-governance:read", "profile-governance", "read", "all"),
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(9028, "profile-governance:review", "profile-governance", "review", "all"),
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(9029, "investment-goal:review", "investment-goal", "review", "all"),
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(9030, "investment-goal:publish", "investment-goal", "publish", "all"),
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(9031, "product-recommendation:review", "product-recommendation", "review", "all"),
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(9032, "product-recommendation:publish", "product-recommendation", "publish", "all"),
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(9033, "asset-allocation:backtest", "asset-allocation", "backtest", "all"),
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(9034, "product-comparison:read:self", "product-comparison", "read", "self"),
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# ---- 9041-9046：投顾治理类 3 个 + 客服二期 3 个 ----
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# 投顾线（`bbf623a`）已把 9020-9034 放进本种子，但漏了这 3 个治理类权限码，
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# 而 `app/service/` 的治理接口直接要求它们 —— 缺了就是"实现了却一直 403"。
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# 号段从 9041 起：库里曾有一批 9020-9035 是 `grant_advisor_role.py` 用旧号段建的，
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# 与种子的 9020-9034 **id→code 映射不同**，挪到 9041 之后与两侧都不冲突。
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(9041, "product-governance:read", "product-governance", "read", "all"),
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(9042, "product-governance:review", "product-governance", "review", "all"),
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(9043, "product-governance:sync", "product-governance", "sync", "all"),
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# 客服二期（画像候选 + 转人工工单）的 3 个权限码。此前不在任何种子或迁移里，
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# 属"环境数据"：代码合过来后若库里缺这几行，候选确认/审核与工单查看 5 个接口一律 403。
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(9044, "memory:candidate:confirm", "memory:candidate", "confirm", "self"),
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(9045, "memory:candidate:review", "memory:candidate", "review", "all"),
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(9046, "handover:read", "handover", "read", "all"),
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# ---- 9047-9050：风控模块四个权限码 ----
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# 风控 Service 和 Agent 工具都按这四个权限码失败关闭。此前依赖
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# `grant_risk_permissions.py` 临时补种，重跑本脚本时会删除 9001-9099 号段内的
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# 风控权限，导致登录成功后风控接口全部 403。这里纳入唯一权限定义源。
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(9047, "risk:alert:read", "risk", "alert", "all"),
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(9048, "risk:alert:write", "risk", "alert", "all"),
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(9049, "risk:alert:scan", "risk", "alert", "all"),
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(9050, "risk:report:mail", "risk", "report", "all"),
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# ---- 9051-9056：代码早就要求、但**从未建过**的 6 个权限码 ----
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# 症状同样是 `AGENT_PERMISSION_DENIED: 缺少操作权限`：看着像角色配错，其实是
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# **权限码根本不存在**，于是任何角色都过不去。对账工具见
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# `tools/check_permission_coverage.py`（把"代码声明的权限"与"库里各角色拥有的"比一遍）。
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# 推广材料：`promotion_material_service.py` 用这四个；第 164 行专门判
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# `"advisor" in context.roles`，说明投顾本来就在这条业务线上。
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(9051, "promotion:read", "promotion", "read", "all"),
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(9052, "promotion:write", "promotion", "write", "all"),
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(9053, "promotion:review", "promotion", "review", "all"),
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(9054, "promotion:deliver", "promotion", "deliver", "all"),
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# NL2SQL 工具声明该权限（`bootstrap.py`）；`financial_nl2sql_service.py:272` 的角色
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# 白名单是 {advisor, operator, admin, super_admin} —— 投顾与运营都要用它。
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(9055, "financial:nl2sql:read", "financial", "nl2sql", "all"),
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# 平台验证探针工具（`platform_probe.py`），只给 admin。
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(9056, "probe:read", "probe", "read", "all"),
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# ---- 9057-9059：`investment-goal:{action}:customer` 三个变体 ----
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# 这三个是**动态拼出来的**：`investment_goal_service.py:270-286` 的
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# `_assert_customer_access` 按 `customer_id == 自己` 决定拼 `:self` 还是 `:customer`，
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# 所以对账工具抓不到字面量，一直以为权限齐了 —— 实际投顾查/建/确认**客户**的目标
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# 全部 403。action 取值来自调用点：`write`(L43) / `confirm`(L110) / `read`(L138,155)。
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#
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# `data_scope` 必须是 `own_customers`：那段代码在后面还会校一次
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# `scope != "all" and (scope != "own_customers" or customer_id not in context.customer_ids)`
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# ⇒ 只有 `own_customers` 且客户确在投顾名下才放行。这是**最小权限**的正确形态：
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# 投顾只看自己服务的客户，而不是全量客户。
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(9057, "investment-goal:read:customer", "investment-goal", "read", "own_customers"),
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(9058, "investment-goal:write:customer", "investment-goal", "write", "own_customers"),
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(9059, "investment-goal:confirm:customer", "investment-goal", "confirm", "own_customers"),
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# ---- 9060-9065：账户看板 + 场内模拟交易（T 段 9 端点） ----
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# ZSY_develop §T 段（docs/05 §19）用户自助端点的权限码。
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# Controller 当前不主动 require，但为与"业务契约 = 权限码声明"一致仍登记进
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# `PERMISSIONS`，同时挂在 `CUSTOMER_PERMISSIONS` 让 customer 角色自带。
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# 号段续 9060（避开 9047-9059 qyqy 风险/推广/探针/投资目标号段）：与 9041-9046 客服二期间隔 1，避免与既有迁移/种子冲突。
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(9060, "account:read:self", "account", "read", "self"),
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# ⚠️ 第 5 个字段是 **data_scope**，只能取 `self` / `own_customers` / `all`。
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# 这四条原先误写成 `trade, order, create` 这样的「resource, action, action」三段，
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# 于是 action 落进了 data_scope 位置（值为 'create'/'read'/'cancel'）。
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# 后果不是"宽松"而是**静默失效**：`IdentityRepository.load_context` 只收集
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# data_scope 合法的权限，这四条会被整条丢掉 ⇒ 客户在**库里明明有**这四个权限，
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# 下单/委托/成交却全部 `403 AGENT_PERMISSION_DENIED`，
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# 而 T001/T006（`account:read:self`/`holding:read:self` 是 'self'）照常 200，
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# 所以现象特别像"只有交易坏了"，很难联想到权限码本身写错。
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(9061, "trade:order:create", "trade", "order", "self"),
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(9062, "trade:order:read", "trade", "order", "self"),
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(9063, "trade:order:cancel", "trade", "order", "self"),
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(9064, "holding:read:self", "holding", "read", "self"),
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(9065, "trade:txn:read", "trade", "txn", "self"),
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# ---- 9066-9068：投顾**代客**三项（`*:customer` 变体） ----
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# 与 9057-9059 是**同一个坑的第二批**：这三个码同样是服务层按
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# `customer_id == context.user_id` **动态拼**出来的，对账工具抓不到字面量，
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# 于是库里从来没有它们，投顾一在投顾工作台对**客户**做操作就整片 403：
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# · `product_recommendation_service.py:71` `product-recommendation:generate:customer`
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# · `asset_allocation_service.py:57` `asset-allocation:generate:customer`
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# · `portfolio_analysis_service.py:46` `portfolio-analysis:read:customer`
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# `data_scope` 必须是 `own_customers`：`AuthorizationService.require_customer_scope`
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# 只放行 `all`，或 `own_customers` 且客户确在 `context.customer_ids`（= 归属客户）内。
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# 这正是投顾该有的最小权限 —— 只对自己服务的客户出方案。
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(9066, "product-recommendation:generate:customer", "product-recommendation",
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"generate", "own_customers"),
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(9067, "asset-allocation:generate:customer", "asset-allocation", "generate",
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"own_customers"),
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(9068, "portfolio-analysis:read:customer", "portfolio-analysis", "read",
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"own_customers"),
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# ---- 9069：客服转人工工单**处置**（分配/接单/解决/关闭/取消） ----
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# 原先只有 9046 `handover:read`（只读队列），于是"工单只能看、不能推进"：
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# 库里 40 张单子全部停在 pending（`docs/02` §7.2 的状态机一个动作也没有入口）。
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# 状态机与审计见 `app/service/customer_service_handover_action_service.py`。
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# data_scope 取 `all`：工单队列本身就是全平台视图，不按归属客户切。
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(9069, "handover:write", "handover", "write", "all"),
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# ---- 9070：推荐方案**删除** ----
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# 投顾工作台「历史方案记录」的四个按钮里，审核/发布复用 9031/9032，删除此前
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# **没有权限码**（`ProductRecommendationService.delete` 是本轮新增）。
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# 不给它单独的 `:self` 变体：删除按 content_id 寻址，归属由服务层的
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# `_visible_customer_ids`（本人 + 名下客户）兜底，与 published/history 同一把尺子。
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(9070, "product-recommendation:delete", "product-recommendation", "delete", "all"),
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# ---- 9071-9074：客户**主动申报**投顾方案 + 投顾受理审批 ----
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# 客户在自己主页提交申报（金额/期限/风险偏好），投顾在工作台受理后自动出草稿。
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# 客户侧用 `:self`（只能看/提自己的）；投顾侧 `read`/`review` 为 `all`，
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# 但**真正的范围限制在服务层**：队列按 `sys_customer_assignment` 归属过滤
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# （`AdvisorServiceRequestService.queue` 复用 `_visible_customer_ids`）。
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(9071, "advisor-request:write:self", "advisor-request", "write", "self"),
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(9072, "advisor-request:read:self", "advisor-request", "read", "self"),
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(9073, "advisor-request:read", "advisor-request", "read", "all"),
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(9074, "advisor-request:review", "advisor-request", "review", "all"),
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)
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# 客户：业务侧自助能力（自己的会话、反馈、转人工、自己的记忆画像）。
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CUSTOMER_PERMISSIONS = (
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9001, 9002, 9003, 9004, 9005, 9006, 9007, 9008, 9009, 9011, 9018,
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9020, 9021, 9022, 9023, 9024, 9025, 9026, 9034,
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# 客服二期：客户确认/拒绝**自己**的画像候选（服务层按 customer_id 过滤，不越权）。
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9044,
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# ZSY §T：账户看板与场内模拟交易（首版仅 customer 角色可用，留 admin 全量）
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9060, 9061, 9062, 9063, 9064, 9065,
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# 客户主动申报投顾方案（提交 + 查看自己的申报）
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9071, 9072,
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)
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# 风控专员：业务侧只读 + 跨客户记忆 + 审计只读，不含配置写权限。
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RISK_PERMISSIONS = (
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9001, 9002, 9003, 9010, 9011, 9012,
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9047, 9048, 9049, 9050,
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)
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# 平台管理员：管理面全套（配置发布四态 + 模型端点 + 审计）。
|
||
ADMIN_PERMISSIONS = tuple(row[0] for row in PERMISSIONS)
|
||
|
||
ROLES: tuple[tuple[int, str, str], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, "customer", "客户"),
|
||
(9002, "risk_operator", "风控专员"),
|
||
(9003, "admin", "平台管理员"),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
USERS: tuple[tuple[int, str, str, str], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, "T-CUST", "cust_t", "customer"),
|
||
(9002, "T-RISK", "risk_t", "employee"),
|
||
(9003, "T-ADMIN", "admin_t", "employee"),
|
||
# 9004 review_t：**不绑任何角色、不设密码**的账号，用于两个边界用例：
|
||
# - `test_rbac_read_mysql`：账号**存在但无权限** → 应返回 200 + 空权限集，而不是 404（错误码语义）；
|
||
# - `test_auth_login_mysql` 的 `PLACEHOLDER_ACCOUNTS`：`password_hash` 是占位符 → 必须 401 而非 500。
|
||
# 2026-09-12 补：此前这两个测试都引用它，但**种子从未创建**它 —— 后者因"账号不存在也返回 401"
|
||
# 而恰好蒙过，前者则一直红（`/admin/users/9004/roles` 返回 404 "用户不存在"）。
|
||
(9004, "T-REVIEW", "review_t", "employee"),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
#: `sys_user.user_type` → `fund_account_status`。口径与 `tools/create_test_user.py`
|
||
#: 的 `FUND_ACCOUNT_STATUS` **必须一致**：客户只有"已开户"才能访问账户域接口，
|
||
#: 员工账号没有基金账户。此前这里（以及 INSERT 语句）硬编码写死 `'closed'`，
|
||
#: 于是种子建的客户永远"未开户"—— `GET /api/v1/users/me/account/dashboard` 与
|
||
#: `GET /api/v1/users/me/cash-ledger` 会返回 404「客户未开户」，前端对应页面直接打不开。
|
||
FUND_ACCOUNT_STATUS_BY_USER_TYPE: dict[str, str] = {
|
||
"customer": "已开户",
|
||
"employee": "closed",
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#: 用户 → 角色绑定，**显式列出**而不是按位置配对。
|
||
#:
|
||
#: 原先写的是 `zip(user_ids, role_ids, strict=True)`，隐含假设「USERS 与 ROLES 一一对应」；
|
||
#: 9004 review_t 是**故意不绑角色**的账号，一加进来 zip 就会
|
||
#: `ValueError: zip() argument 2 is shorter than argument 1`，整个种子跑不完
|
||
#: （而 commit 在最后，外部表现是"什么都没发生"）。显式列表让"谁绑什么"一眼可见，
|
||
#: 也不受两侧顺序/长度变化影响。
|
||
USER_ROLES: tuple[tuple[int, int], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, 9001), # cust_t → customer
|
||
(9002, 9002), # risk_t → risk_operator
|
||
(9003, 9003), # admin_t → admin
|
||
# 9004 review_t 不在此列：「账号存在但无权限」正是它要覆盖的场景。
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
GRANTS: tuple[tuple[int, tuple[int, ...]], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, CUSTOMER_PERMISSIONS),
|
||
(9002, RISK_PERMISSIONS),
|
||
(9003, ADMIN_PERMISSIONS),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
|
||
async def seed() -> None:
|
||
now = datetime.now(UTC).replace(tzinfo=None)
|
||
# MySQL 的 DATETIME(0) 会把微秒四舍五入到秒：若用"当前时间"写 assigned_at，
|
||
# 进位后可能落在未来，使紧随其后的 `assigned_at <= now` 授权校验判定
|
||
# "尚未生效"，于是刚种好的账号一个权限都拿不到（表现为 roles=() 而非报错）。
|
||
# 往前留 5 秒，彻底避开这个舍入窗口。
|
||
effective_at = now - timedelta(seconds=5)
|
||
async with SessionFactory() as session:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text("DELETE FROM sys_role_permission WHERE role_id IN (9001,9002,9003)")
|
||
)
|
||
await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_user_role WHERE user_id IN (9001,9002,9003)"))
|
||
# 风控权限在旧环境中可能由 `grant_risk_permissions.py` 自动分配了任意主键。
|
||
# 先按 permission_code 清掉角色绑定和旧主键，保证本次能用固定号段重建；
|
||
# 否则 `risk:report:mail` 已存在于 9001-9099 之外时会触发 permission_code 唯一键冲突。
|
||
await session.execute(text("""
|
||
DELETE rp FROM sys_role_permission rp
|
||
JOIN sys_permission p ON p.id = rp.permission_id
|
||
WHERE p.permission_code IN (
|
||
'risk:alert:read', 'risk:alert:write',
|
||
'risk:alert:scan', 'risk:report:mail'
|
||
)
|
||
"""))
|
||
await session.execute(text("""
|
||
DELETE FROM sys_permission
|
||
WHERE permission_code IN (
|
||
'risk:alert:read', 'risk:alert:write',
|
||
'risk:alert:scan', 'risk:report:mail'
|
||
)
|
||
"""))
|
||
await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_permission WHERE id BETWEEN 9001 AND 9099"))
|
||
await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_role WHERE id IN (9001,9002,9003)"))
|
||
# 不再 DELETE sys_user：投顾域的 advisor_profile_tag 等表用 FK 引用它，库里有数据引用
|
||
# 9001-9003 时删除会被外键拒绝（1451）导致整个种子跑不完，而且删了用户等于把演示密码
|
||
# 一起弄丢。改为下面循环里的「更新或插入」，且不覆盖 password_hash。
|
||
|
||
for user_id, user_no, user_name, user_type in USERS:
|
||
# 开户状态按角色区分，与 `tools/create_test_user.py` 的 FUND_ACCOUNT_STATUS 口径一致：
|
||
# **客户必须"已开户"**，否则账户域接口会一律 404「客户未开户」——
|
||
# 实测受影响的是 `GET /api/v1/users/me/account/dashboard`（前端 T001）与
|
||
# `GET /api/v1/users/me/cash-ledger`（T009），页面直接打不开。
|
||
# 员工账号没有基金账户，保持 closed。
|
||
fund_status = FUND_ACCOUNT_STATUS_BY_USER_TYPE.get(user_type, "closed")
|
||
updated = await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"UPDATE sys_user SET user_no=:no, username=:name, user_type=:type,"
|
||
" professional_investor_status='none', fund_account_status=:fund,"
|
||
" status='正常', updated_at=:now WHERE id=:id"
|
||
),
|
||
{"id": user_id, "no": user_no, "name": user_name, "type": user_type,
|
||
"fund": fund_status, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
if updated.rowcount == 0:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_user (id, user_no, username, password_hash, user_type,"
|
||
" professional_investor_status, fund_account_status, status,"
|
||
" created_at, updated_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:id,:no,:name,'x',:type,'none',:fund,'正常',:now,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"id": user_id, "no": user_no, "name": user_name,
|
||
"type": user_type, "fund": fund_status, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
for role_id, role_code, role_name in ROLES:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_role (id, role_code, role_name, status, created_at, updated_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:id,:code,:name,'active',:now,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"id": role_id, "code": role_code, "name": role_name, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
for permission_id, code, resource, action, scope in PERMISSIONS:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_permission"
|
||
" (id, permission_code, resource, action, data_scope, created_at, updated_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:id,:code,:resource,:action,:scope,:now,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"id": permission_id, "code": code, "resource": resource, "action": action,
|
||
"scope": scope, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
for user_id, role_id in USER_ROLES:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_user_role (user_id, role_id, assigned_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:user,:role,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"user": user_id, "role": role_id, "now": effective_at},
|
||
)
|
||
for role_id, permission_ids in GRANTS:
|
||
for permission_id in permission_ids:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_role_permission (role_id, permission_id, created_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:role,:perm,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"role": role_id, "perm": permission_id, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
await session.commit()
|
||
|
||
|
||
async def verify() -> None:
|
||
service = IdentityService()
|
||
for label, user_id in (("customer", CUSTOMER_USER), ("risk_operator", RISK_USER),
|
||
("admin", ADMIN_USER)):
|
||
context = await service.resolve(RequestContext(user_id=user_id, trace_id="verify-trace"))
|
||
print(
|
||
f"{label:14s} roles={context.roles} permissions={sorted(context.permissions)} "
|
||
f"portal={context.portal} data_scope={context.data_scope}"
|
||
)
|
||
customer = await service.resolve(
|
||
RequestContext(user_id=CUSTOMER_USER, trace_id="verify-trace")
|
||
)
|
||
missing = {"agent:run", "suitability:read", "fund:quote:read"} - set(customer.permissions)
|
||
if missing:
|
||
raise SystemExit(f"客户角色缺少公共工具所需权限：{sorted(missing)}")
|
||
print("verified: customer can pass public tool authorization checks")
|
||
|
||
|
||
async def main() -> None:
|
||
await seed()
|
||
await verify()
|
||
|
||
|
||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||
asyncio.run(main())
|