251 lines
14 KiB
Python
251 lines
14 KiB
Python
"""造 RBAC 测试数据，验证真实链路身份加载与越权拦截。
|
||
|
||
数据使用 9001 起的号段（角色 9001-9003、权限 9001-9046），便于清理，不影响业务数据。
|
||
权限码是几条线叠加出来的：9001-9019 基础能力、9020-9034 投顾线、9041-9046 投顾治理类与客服二期。
|
||
|
||
⚠️ 本脚本对**权限、角色、角色绑定**是 **DELETE 重建**：`DELETE FROM sys_permission WHERE
|
||
id BETWEEN 9001 AND 9099` 会删掉该号段内**所有**权限（包括别的线用 `grant_*.py` 建的），
|
||
再按 `PERMISSIONS` 重建，并且**只清 role_id 9001-9003 的角色绑定**。三个已知后果：
|
||
|
||
1. 新增权限码必须并进本文件的 `PERMISSIONS`，否则重建一次就没了（表现为"接口突然 403"）；
|
||
2. `advisor`（9004）这类不在 `ROLES` 里的角色，其绑定**不会被清** —— 若它们引用的
|
||
permission_id 在重建时换了语义，绑定就会指向错误的权限码。改 id→code 映射前先确认；
|
||
3. **`sys_user` 不再是 DELETE 重建**（2026-09-12 改）：投顾域的 `advisor_profile_tag` 等表用
|
||
FK 引用 `sys_user`，一旦库里有数据引用 9001-9003，`DELETE FROM sys_user` 会被外键拒绝
|
||
（MySQL 1451），**种子整个跑不完**；而 `commit()` 在最后，所以外部表现是"什么都没发生"。
|
||
现已改为「存在则 UPDATE 非密码字段、不存在才 INSERT」，且**不覆盖 `password_hash`**，
|
||
因此重跑种子不会再弄丢演示密码，也不需要事后补 `set_user_password.py`。
|
||
|
||
为什么需要这份种子：权限码必须与**代码实际声明**一致——工具声明写在
|
||
`app/service/agent/bootstrap.py`（`check_suitability` 需 `suitability:read`、
|
||
`query_fund_quote` 需 `fund:quote:read`），接口校验写在各 Service 的
|
||
`AuthorizationService.require(...)`。种子缺权限的后果不是"少测一项"，而是
|
||
"功能明明实现了却一直 403"，让验收与集成测试得出错误结论。
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||
|
||
import asyncio
|
||
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
|
||
|
||
from sqlalchemy import text
|
||
|
||
from app.core.contracts import RequestContext
|
||
from app.infrastructure.db import SessionFactory
|
||
from app.service.identity_service import IdentityService
|
||
|
||
CUSTOMER_USER = "9001"
|
||
RISK_USER = "9002"
|
||
ADMIN_USER = "9003"
|
||
|
||
# (权限 id, 权限码, resource, action, data_scope)
|
||
PERMISSIONS: tuple[tuple[int, str, str, str, str], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, "agent:run", "agent", "run", "self"),
|
||
(9002, "suitability:read", "suitability", "read", "self"),
|
||
(9003, "fund:quote:read", "fund", "quote", "self"),
|
||
(9004, "conversation:create", "conversation", "create", "self"),
|
||
(9005, "conversation:close", "conversation", "close", "self"),
|
||
(9006, "conversation:feedback", "conversation", "feedback", "self"),
|
||
(9007, "agent:cancel", "agent", "cancel", "self"),
|
||
(9008, "handover:create", "handover", "create", "self"),
|
||
(9009, "memory:read:self", "memory", "read", "self"),
|
||
(9010, "memory:read:customer", "memory", "read", "own_customers"),
|
||
(9011, "knowledge:reference:read", "knowledge", "reference", "self"),
|
||
(9012, "audit:read", "audit", "read", "all"),
|
||
(9013, "config:read", "config", "read", "all"),
|
||
(9014, "config:write", "config", "write", "all"),
|
||
(9015, "config:review", "config", "review", "all"),
|
||
(9016, "config:activate", "config", "activate", "all"),
|
||
(9017, "model-endpoint:manage", "model-endpoint", "manage", "all"),
|
||
# `query_knowledge` 工具声明该权限（`app/service/knowledge_tool.py` 的
|
||
# `REQUIRED_PERMISSION`）；缺失会让客服 Agent 调工具时被拒（缺少工具权限）。
|
||
# 补入种子以保证"重跑种子 / 换环境"后权限仍存在。
|
||
(9018, "knowledge:query", "knowledge", "query", "self"),
|
||
# 知识库**管理**面（Task 11）：上传/列表/删除三个端点统一要这个权限码
|
||
# （`app/service/knowledge_management_service.py` 的 `REQUIRED_PERMISSION`）。
|
||
# 刻意不把 `knowledge:query`（客户角色也有）复用成管理权限：那会让客户看到整库文档清单。
|
||
# 归属：只给 admin（ADMIN_PERMISSIONS 是全量元组，自动包含本行）。
|
||
(9019, "knowledge:manage", "knowledge", "manage", "all"),
|
||
(9020, "investment-goal:write:self", "investment-goal", "write", "self"),
|
||
(9021, "investment-goal:confirm:self", "investment-goal", "confirm", "self"),
|
||
(9022, "investment-goal:read:self", "investment-goal", "read", "self"),
|
||
(9023, "product-recommendation:generate:self", "product-recommendation", "generate", "self"),
|
||
(9024, "product-recommendation:read:self", "product-recommendation", "read", "self"),
|
||
(9025, "portfolio-analysis:read:self", "portfolio-analysis", "read", "self"),
|
||
(9026, "asset-allocation:generate:self", "asset-allocation", "generate", "self"),
|
||
(9027, "profile-governance:read", "profile-governance", "read", "all"),
|
||
(9028, "profile-governance:review", "profile-governance", "review", "all"),
|
||
(9029, "investment-goal:review", "investment-goal", "review", "all"),
|
||
(9030, "investment-goal:publish", "investment-goal", "publish", "all"),
|
||
(9031, "product-recommendation:review", "product-recommendation", "review", "all"),
|
||
(9032, "product-recommendation:publish", "product-recommendation", "publish", "all"),
|
||
(9033, "asset-allocation:backtest", "asset-allocation", "backtest", "all"),
|
||
(9034, "product-comparison:read:self", "product-comparison", "read", "self"),
|
||
# ---- 9041-9046：投顾治理类 3 个 + 客服二期 3 个 ----
|
||
# 投顾线（`bbf623a`）已把 9020-9034 放进本种子，但漏了这 3 个治理类权限码，
|
||
# 而 `app/service/` 的治理接口直接要求它们 —— 缺了就是"实现了却一直 403"。
|
||
# 号段从 9041 起：库里曾有一批 9020-9035 是 `grant_advisor_role.py` 用旧号段建的，
|
||
# 与种子的 9020-9034 **id→code 映射不同**，挪到 9041 之后与两侧都不冲突。
|
||
(9041, "product-governance:read", "product-governance", "read", "all"),
|
||
(9042, "product-governance:review", "product-governance", "review", "all"),
|
||
(9043, "product-governance:sync", "product-governance", "sync", "all"),
|
||
# 客服二期（画像候选 + 转人工工单）的 3 个权限码。此前不在任何种子或迁移里，
|
||
# 属"环境数据"：代码合过来后若库里缺这几行，候选确认/审核与工单查看 5 个接口一律 403。
|
||
(9044, "memory:candidate:confirm", "memory:candidate", "confirm", "self"),
|
||
(9045, "memory:candidate:review", "memory:candidate", "review", "all"),
|
||
(9046, "handover:read", "handover", "read", "all"),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
# 客户：业务侧自助能力（自己的会话、反馈、转人工、自己的记忆画像）。
|
||
CUSTOMER_PERMISSIONS = (
|
||
9001, 9002, 9003, 9004, 9005, 9006, 9007, 9008, 9009, 9011, 9018,
|
||
9020, 9021, 9022, 9023, 9024, 9025, 9026, 9034,
|
||
# 客服二期：客户确认/拒绝**自己**的画像候选（服务层按 customer_id 过滤，不越权）。
|
||
9044,
|
||
)
|
||
# 风控专员：业务侧只读 + 跨客户记忆 + 审计只读，不含配置写权限。
|
||
RISK_PERMISSIONS = (9001, 9002, 9003, 9010, 9011, 9012)
|
||
# 平台管理员：管理面全套（配置发布四态 + 模型端点 + 审计）。
|
||
ADMIN_PERMISSIONS = tuple(row[0] for row in PERMISSIONS)
|
||
|
||
ROLES: tuple[tuple[int, str, str], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, "customer", "客户"),
|
||
(9002, "risk_operator", "风控专员"),
|
||
(9003, "admin", "平台管理员"),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
USERS: tuple[tuple[int, str, str, str], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, "T-CUST", "cust_t", "customer"),
|
||
(9002, "T-RISK", "risk_t", "employee"),
|
||
(9003, "T-ADMIN", "admin_t", "employee"),
|
||
# 9004 review_t：**不绑任何角色、不设密码**的账号，用于两个边界用例：
|
||
# - `test_rbac_read_mysql`：账号**存在但无权限** → 应返回 200 + 空权限集，而不是 404（错误码语义）；
|
||
# - `test_auth_login_mysql` 的 `PLACEHOLDER_ACCOUNTS`：`password_hash` 是占位符 → 必须 401 而非 500。
|
||
# 2026-09-12 补：此前这两个测试都引用它，但**种子从未创建**它 —— 后者因"账号不存在也返回 401"
|
||
# 而恰好蒙过，前者则一直红（`/admin/users/9004/roles` 返回 404 "用户不存在"）。
|
||
(9004, "T-REVIEW", "review_t", "employee"),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
#: 用户 → 角色绑定，**显式列出**而不是按位置配对。
|
||
#:
|
||
#: 原先写的是 `zip(user_ids, role_ids, strict=True)`，隐含假设「USERS 与 ROLES 一一对应」；
|
||
#: 9004 review_t 是**故意不绑角色**的账号，一加进来 zip 就会
|
||
#: `ValueError: zip() argument 2 is shorter than argument 1`，整个种子跑不完
|
||
#: （而 commit 在最后，外部表现是"什么都没发生"）。显式列表让"谁绑什么"一眼可见，
|
||
#: 也不受两侧顺序/长度变化影响。
|
||
USER_ROLES: tuple[tuple[int, int], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, 9001), # cust_t → customer
|
||
(9002, 9002), # risk_t → risk_operator
|
||
(9003, 9003), # admin_t → admin
|
||
# 9004 review_t 不在此列：「账号存在但无权限」正是它要覆盖的场景。
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
GRANTS: tuple[tuple[int, tuple[int, ...]], ...] = (
|
||
(9001, CUSTOMER_PERMISSIONS),
|
||
(9002, RISK_PERMISSIONS),
|
||
(9003, ADMIN_PERMISSIONS),
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
|
||
async def seed() -> None:
|
||
now = datetime.now(UTC).replace(tzinfo=None)
|
||
# MySQL 的 DATETIME(0) 会把微秒四舍五入到秒：若用"当前时间"写 assigned_at，
|
||
# 进位后可能落在未来，使紧随其后的 `assigned_at <= now` 授权校验判定
|
||
# "尚未生效"，于是刚种好的账号一个权限都拿不到（表现为 roles=() 而非报错）。
|
||
# 往前留 5 秒，彻底避开这个舍入窗口。
|
||
effective_at = now - timedelta(seconds=5)
|
||
async with SessionFactory() as session:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text("DELETE FROM sys_role_permission WHERE role_id IN (9001,9002,9003)")
|
||
)
|
||
await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_user_role WHERE user_id IN (9001,9002,9003)"))
|
||
await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_permission WHERE id BETWEEN 9001 AND 9099"))
|
||
await session.execute(text("DELETE FROM sys_role WHERE id IN (9001,9002,9003)"))
|
||
# 不再 DELETE sys_user：投顾域的 advisor_profile_tag 等表用 FK 引用它，库里有数据引用
|
||
# 9001-9003 时删除会被外键拒绝（1451）导致整个种子跑不完，而且删了用户等于把演示密码
|
||
# 一起弄丢。改为下面循环里的「更新或插入」，且不覆盖 password_hash。
|
||
|
||
for user_id, user_no, user_name, user_type in USERS:
|
||
updated = await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"UPDATE sys_user SET user_no=:no, username=:name, user_type=:type,"
|
||
" professional_investor_status='none', fund_account_status='closed',"
|
||
" status='正常', updated_at=:now WHERE id=:id"
|
||
),
|
||
{"id": user_id, "no": user_no, "name": user_name, "type": user_type, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
if updated.rowcount == 0:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_user (id, user_no, username, password_hash, user_type,"
|
||
" professional_investor_status, fund_account_status, status,"
|
||
" created_at, updated_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:id,:no,:name,'x',:type,'none','closed','正常',:now,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"id": user_id, "no": user_no, "name": user_name,
|
||
"type": user_type, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
for role_id, role_code, role_name in ROLES:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_role (id, role_code, role_name, status, created_at, updated_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:id,:code,:name,'active',:now,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"id": role_id, "code": role_code, "name": role_name, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
for permission_id, code, resource, action, scope in PERMISSIONS:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_permission"
|
||
" (id, permission_code, resource, action, data_scope, created_at, updated_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:id,:code,:resource,:action,:scope,:now,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"id": permission_id, "code": code, "resource": resource, "action": action,
|
||
"scope": scope, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
for user_id, role_id in USER_ROLES:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_user_role (user_id, role_id, assigned_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:user,:role,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"user": user_id, "role": role_id, "now": effective_at},
|
||
)
|
||
for role_id, permission_ids in GRANTS:
|
||
for permission_id in permission_ids:
|
||
await session.execute(
|
||
text(
|
||
"INSERT INTO sys_role_permission (role_id, permission_id, created_at)"
|
||
" VALUES (:role,:perm,:now)"
|
||
),
|
||
{"role": role_id, "perm": permission_id, "now": now},
|
||
)
|
||
await session.commit()
|
||
|
||
|
||
async def verify() -> None:
|
||
service = IdentityService()
|
||
for label, user_id in (("customer", CUSTOMER_USER), ("risk_operator", RISK_USER),
|
||
("admin", ADMIN_USER)):
|
||
context = await service.resolve(RequestContext(user_id=user_id, trace_id="verify-trace"))
|
||
print(
|
||
f"{label:14s} roles={context.roles} permissions={sorted(context.permissions)} "
|
||
f"portal={context.portal} data_scope={context.data_scope}"
|
||
)
|
||
customer = await service.resolve(
|
||
RequestContext(user_id=CUSTOMER_USER, trace_id="verify-trace")
|
||
)
|
||
missing = {"agent:run", "suitability:read", "fund:quote:read"} - set(customer.permissions)
|
||
if missing:
|
||
raise SystemExit(f"客户角色缺少公共工具所需权限：{sorted(missing)}")
|
||
print("verified: customer can pass public tool authorization checks")
|
||
|
||
|
||
async def main() -> None:
|
||
await seed()
|
||
await verify()
|
||
|
||
|
||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||
asyncio.run(main())
|